Vertical integration, market floreclosure and quality investment by Hernán, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen
 
 
Working Paper  06-14  
Economics Series 05 
February  2006 
 
 
Departamento de Economía 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91 624 98 75 
 
 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION, MARKET FORECLOSURE AND QUALITY 
INVESTMENT * 
 
Roberto Hernan 1 and Praveen Kujal 2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Incentives to vertically integrate are studied in an industry where downstream firms are vertically 
differentiated. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. 
Increased production costs impact quality investment both by the integrated firm and the 
unintegrated rival. A firm, integrating first, always produces the high quality good and earns 
higher profits. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) 
scenario and competition among downstream firms is softened. A fully integrated industry, with 
increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social 
welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration. 
 
 
Keywords: L1, L4, L5, L13 . 
 
JEL Classification: Vertical Differentiation, quality investment, foreclosure, production costs 
 
 
* Acknowledgements: Kujal acknowledges financial support from grant Ministerio de Educación 
y Ciencia, SEJ 2005-08633. +Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departament of Economics, 
Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, SPAIN. Kujal: Tel. +(34) 91 624 9651, email: 
kujal@eco.uc3m.es. 
 
  
                                                           
1 Roberto Hernan, Universidad Europea de Madrid, C/ Tajo s/n. 28670 Villaviciosa de Odón, Madrid, SPAIN. 
2 Praveen Kujal, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departament of Economics, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, 
SPAIN 
Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure and
Quality Investment
Roberto Hernán* and Praveen Kujal**∗
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
February 27, 2006
Abstract
Incentives to vertically integrate are studied in an industry where
downstream firms are vertically differentiated. Vertical integration by
one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased pro-
duction costs impact quality investment both by the integrated firm
and the unintegrated rival. A firm, integrating first, always produces
the high quality good and earns higher profits. Quality investment
by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario and
competition among downstream firms is softened. A fully integrated
industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equi-
librium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this
structure is greater than under no integration.
∗*Tel.: +91 ; e-mail: Roberto.Hernan@uem.es. **Tel.: +91 624 96 51; fax: +91 624
97 85; e-mail: kujal@eco.uc3m.es.
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1 Introduction
An important aspect of any oligopolistic market structure is investment in
long run variables such as quality, R&D, or advertising (Sutton, 1991). The
focus of most models has been the impact of vertical integration on prod-
uct costs and market competitiveness, in horizontal product differentiation
models. The impact of such practices on long run variables such as quality,
or R&D has mostly been ignored (with the exception of Stefanadis (1997),
Banerjee and Lin (2003) and Brocas (2003) who look at R&D). In this paper
we show that while the direct affect of vertical integration and foreclosure is
an increase in production costs, it subsequently affects investment in quality
for both the integrated and the non-integrated firm. While both the firms
decreases quality investment, the non-integrated firm decreases its quality
investment by a greater amount. The final effect of this is an increase in
product differentiation resulting in softening of competition1.
The literature on vertical integration, as a strategic decision affecting
competition2, has focussed on mergers between input and output producers.
The analyses has focussed on conditions under which vertical integration and
foreclosure takes place, and when they can be welfare increasing. While little
has been said on the effect of investment in long run variables such as quality,
or R&D. Some recent papers have looked at R&D in vertically related indus-
tries. Stefanadis (1997) studies the effect of R&D investment in a successive
duopoly3. In his model firms integrate strategically to reduce the incentives of
the non-integrated upstream firm to invest in R&D. This is achieved through
a reduction in demand for the input, subsequently obtaining a advantageous
position in the final goods market. Banerjee and Lin (2003) study the ef-
fect of downstream innovation in vertically related markets. By increasing
demand for the input, downstream R&D increases the price for the down-
stream firm. This lowers the benefit to R&D to the downstream firm plus it
raises rivals’ costs. Due to this, the downstream oligopolist invests more in
R&D than a monopoly does. Brocas (2003), meanwhile, studies innovation
in the upstream market. Adopting a new technology has a switching cost.
Prices of licenses, for the technology, vary with this cost. Easily substitutable
technologies command a low price and innovators benefit from a lock in effect
for technologies with high switching costs. More importantly the price affects
1This results does not hold when firms merge simultaneously in the first stage. As one
expects the strategic motive of raising rivals costs, which is the focus of most papers, is
lost in simultaneous vertical mergers.
2See Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990).
3In his model there are several firms that supply the input. However, only two of them
invest in R&D to obtain the new technology.
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the ex-ante private incentives to invest in R&D resulting in the disappear-
ance of efficient technologies with low (switching) costs. In such a framework
innovators and producers may find it profitable to integrate vertically before
investing.
We develop a simple model that looks at the relationship between verti-
cal integration and market foreclosure in vertically differentiated industries.
Using the same industry structure as in Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990,
OSS henceforth) we show that partial, or full, sequential integration results
in a decrease in quality investment by both the low and high quality firm.
Interestingly, a vertically integrating firm affects both production and quality
costs for its non-integrated rival. In our model a firm integrating first always
earns greater profits. Considering only sequential vertical mergers the equi-
librium market structure obtained is full integration where, total welfare is
greater than under no, or partial, integration.
Integration between an upstream and a downstream firm is a strategic
decision as it affects rival profits and the market structure. The decision of
the integrated firm to not sell the input to its rival has two effects in our
model. First, it decreases competition in the upstream market resulting in
increased production costs for the downstream rival4. The second important
effect in our model is observed upon quality investment. Note that, the unin-
tegrated firms’ quality investment decision is also conditioned by the higher
production costs that it faces. Increased production costs negatively affect
quality investment by the unintegrated firm. Given that the low quality firm
has less incentives to invest in quality results in the high quality firm invest-
ing less too. The decrease in quality investment, however, is greater for the
unintegrated low quality firm. Due to this, the degree of product differenti-
ation increases. If the low quality firm integrates first then no equilibrium
in pure strategies exists (in which the low quality continues producing the
low quality good). In this case leapfrogging is observed resulting in the low
quality firm becoming the high quality producer.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we describe
the basic model. Following this we study several different market structures.
Then we analyze the industry structure in equilibrium. The last section
concludes.
4The effect of reducing competition in the output stage by increasing input costs has
been studied by Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987).
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2 The model
Consider a successive duopoly where two upstream firms (U1 and U2) produce
a homogenous good at constant marginal costs. The input is transformed
one-to-one by the downstream firm into a final good. The final product is
vertically differentiated. Goods of quality s1 and s2 are obtained after the
firms invest in quality. Let us denote s1 as the high, and s2 as the low, quality
good, such that s1 > s25. Production cost for the final good, qi, are given by,
CDi(si, qi) = ci · qi +
1
2
s2i , i = 1, 2 (1)
where ci is the input price.
Production costs are independent of quality costs. Note that quality
costs are endogenous and are sunk in the output competition stage. Costs
of production for the upstream firm Ui are given by CUi(Xi) = cUXi, where
cU is the unit production costs for the input. Without loss of generality we
assume that marginal costs of production, cU , are zero for both the upstream
firms.
Assume that a continuum of consumers exist on the demand side6. Each
consumer has parameter θ, where θ is distributed uniformly in the interval
[0, θ¯]. Consumers have unit demand and have utility,
U =
½
θs− p purchasing one unit of the good with quality s and price p
0 otherwise
We denote by θˆ12 = p1−p2s1−s2 as the consumer that is indifferent between
consuming the high and the low quality good. Similarly the consumer indif-
ferent between consuming the low quality good and not consuming at all can
denoted by θˆ02 = p2s2 . Given this, the indirect demand functions are obtained
for the high and low quality good, respectively:
p1 = s1(θ¯ − q1)− s2q2 (2a)
p2 = s2(θ¯ − q1 − q2) (2b)
where q1 and q2 are the quantities produced by the high and low quality
downstream firms, respectively.
5See Shaked and Sutton (1983).
6We use the standard product differentiation developed in Shaked and Sutton (1983).
Also see Motta (1993).
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We consider a five stage game (see figure 1). In the first stage (and
maintaining the OSS notation), the downstream firm, D1 and D2, negotiate
with the upstream firms, U1 and U2, to integrate or not. Simplifying the
process and to maintain comparability with OSS we assume that firms Di
make a take it or leave it offer, bi, to firms Ui, i = 1, 27. FirmD and U merge
to form a single firm F 8.
Figure 1: Stages
In the second stage, firms D1 and D2, or the integrated firm(s), select
profit maximizing levels of quality. In the third stage, the upstream firms,
integrated or not, select the price at which they sell the input. We assume
Bertrand competition in the input market9. If both the upstream firms com-
pete then the price in equilibrium equals marginal cost. Similarly, the price
would be the same if an integrated, and unintegrated, firm compete in the
input market. This eliminates the strategic incentives to integrate (and in-
crease rival costs). We assume that the integrated firm does not sell the input
to its rival, focusing instead on the case of market foreclosure on the part of
the integrated firm. Market foreclosure leaves its rival acting as a monopolist
against the unintegrated downstream firm.
However, the unintegrated firm can integrate in the fourth stage. The
integration process is the same as in the first stage. That is, the unintegrated
firm D makes a take it or leave it offer to the (unintegrated) U firm. If the
latter accepts, then they integrate forming firm F . A firm integrating first
decides on its strategy taking into account that its rivals are not integrated.
This clearly affects the quality investment decision and, those made in the
output and the input markets. Unintegrated firms can contraintegrate later,
thus restoring the initial situation. However, as contraintegration occurs after
7One can formulate the bidding at this stage in several ways. One can use the structure
in OSS, which we also use. OSS then study the robustness of their results with two different
formulations. In one, upstream firms bid and in the other the downstream firms bid for the
two upstream firms. Their main results do not change. Only the bids and the distribution
of profits is different in the first case.
8Given the symmetry of the upstream firms we denote the integrated firm, between Di
and Ui, as Fi
9The advantage of price competition is that it isolates the problem of the strategic
value of vertical integration for the integrating firm. For a greater discussion see OSS.
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quality investment, competition in qualities results in different qualities. As a
consequence, output and prices are different from when no integration occurs.
Finally in stage five the firms compete in quantities.
Depending on how firms vertically integrate we can have six possible
market structures. First is the case of no integration (NI). We then have
two cases of partial integration (PIi), where only one of the firms integrates
in the first stage of the game. Then we have two cases of Full Sequential
Integration (FIi). In this case one of firms integrates in the first stage while
the other integrates in the fourth stage10.
In the following section we obtain the quality, output and prices for each
one of the market structures mentioned above. The game is solved using
subgame perfection and we study equilibria in pure strategies only. Finally
we discuss the market structure that emerges in equilibrium.
3 No Integration (NI)
Assuming that no firm integrates, we first solve for outputs in the final stage.
FirmDmaximize profits,maxqi πi = (pi−ci)qi−
s2i
2
. The first order conditions
give us the reaction functions
q1 =
s1θ¯ − c1 − q2s2
2s1
(3a)
q2 =
s2θ¯ − c2 − q1s2
2s2
(3b)
Solving for the equilibrium quantities, q1 (s1, s2, c1, c2) , q2 (s1, s2, c1, c2), we
obtain.
q1 (s1, s2, c1, c2) =
(2s1 − s2) θ¯ − 2c1 + c2
4s1 − s2
(4a)
q2 (s1, s2, c1, c2) =
s1s2θ¯ − 2c2s1 + c1s2
s1 (4s1 − s2)
(4b)
In the third stage of the game firms U1 and U2 compete in prices for the
input demand (q1 + q2). Price competition in a homogenous input gives us
price equal to marginal cost in equilibrium, i.e., ci = 0, i = 1, 2.
10We maintain the notation followed by OSS.
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In the second stage firms choose quality levels maximizing profits,maxsi Πi =
qi (s1, s2, c1, c2) · pi (q1 (s1, s2, c1, c2) , q2 (s1, s2, c1, c2))− 12s2i , i = 1, 2. The im-
plicit reaction functions obtained from the first order condition are
s1 =
(16s31 − 12s21s2 + 4s1s22 − s32) θ¯
2
(4s1 − s2)3
(5)
s2 =
s21 (4s1 + s2) θ¯
2
(4s1 − s2)3
(6)
and can be seen in figure 2.
Figure 2: Quality reaction functions under No Integration.
From the first order conditions ([5] and [6]) we first numerically compute
the equilibrium qualities. The quantities and profits are then obtained under
NI (for details see Motta, 1993). The results are shown in table 1.
sNI1 = 0.251942θ¯
2 sNI2 = 0.090223θ¯
2
qNI1 = 0.450834θ¯ qNI2 = 0.274583θ¯
ΠNIU1 = 0 Π
NI
U2 = 0
ΠNID1 = 0.019470θ¯
4 ΠNID2 = 0.002732θ¯
4
Table 1: No Integration.
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4 Partial Integration (PIi)
Under partial integration only one of the downstream firm (Di) integrates
with the upstream firm (Ui). This results in a single integrated firm Fi. Using
subgame perfection we first solve for the output competition stage. The
output reaction functions and the equilibrium output are the same as in the
NI game (see equations [3a] and [3b]). Note that, the only difference between
the two is that the input price is now a transfer price for the integrated firm.
We set ci = 0. The non-integrated firm meanwhile faces the input price that
is determined in the third stage.
The equilibrium price equals marginal cost in the input competition stage
if Fi decides to sell the input to the downstream firm Dj. In this case
integration does not grant any advantage to Fi. In fact, Di loses with respect
to the NI case as it incurs a cost when integrating with Ui. However, Fi
can raise its rivals cost by not selling it the input. Then the rival faces a
monopolist in the input market and pays a monopoly price for the input.
The upstream Uj sets the input price maximizing profits, maxcj ΠUj = cj ·
qj(cj , si, sj) where qj(cj , si, sj) is obtained from equations [4a] and [4b].
If both firms, D1 and U1, integrate, then firm U2 sets an input price
cPI2 = s2θ¯4 , maximizing profits, maxc2 ΠU2 . However, if firms D2 and U2
integrate then the non-integrated firm U1, maximizing profits maxc1 ΠU1 , sets
a price cPI1 =
(2s1−s2)θ¯
4
for the input. The price, ci, paid by the firms depends
on whether the high, or low, quality firm integrates. It is easy to see that
the price paid by the high quality firm (if low is integrated), cPI1 , is greater
than the price paid by the low quality firm (if high is integrated), cPI2 . This
is an interesting result as it tells us that the high quality firm pays a higher
price for its input than a lower quality firm would.
In the second stage of the game firms Fi and Dj set qualities maximizing
their profits (taking into account that firm Dj pays a price cPIj for each unit
of the input it buys). The implicit reaction functions obtained from the max-
imization problem are plotted in figure 3. First notice that (see figure 3a) the
reaction function of the integrated firm F1 moves out and that of the non-
integrated firm D2 moves towards the origin. An integrated firm increases
production costs for the non-integrated firm (as defined by Salop and Scheff-
man (1983 and 1987) and also obtained in OSS). The increased input price
it faces D2 (cPI2 ) shifts its reaction function towards the origin. The reaction
function of firm D1, however, shifts outwards due to decreased competition
in the final good market (see figure 3b). Equilibrium qualities obtained under
PI1 are given by the intersection point of the reaction function and are:
8
sPI11 = 0.250054θ¯
2 sPI12 = 0.016710θ¯
2 (7)
Equilibrium output and profit are shown in table 2:
qPI11 = 0.495753θ¯ qPI12 = 0.127124θ¯
ΠPI1U1 = b1 Π
PI1
U2 = 0.000531θ¯
4
ΠPI1D1 = 0.030192θ¯
4 − b1 ΠPI1D2 = 0.000130θ¯
4
Table 2: Only high quality firm integrates.
Leapfrogging is observed in the case where only the low quality firm
integrates (PI2). An equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist in this
case. Looking at figure 3b one can see that the reaction functions do not
intersect in the relevant range where s1 > s2. The reaction function of the
low quality firm (D2) moves out due to the cost advantage against the rival
while the reaction function of the high quality firm (D1) moves inwards.
The shift is large enough such that the functions do not intersect. The only
equilibrium in this case is one where the low quality firm “leapfrogs” its rival
and produces the high quality good.
The only case where the equilibrium in pure strategies exists is where the
high quality firm integrates first (see figure 3a). In this case firm, D1 needs
to make an offer to firm U1 to vertically integrate. The offer firm U1 is willing
to accept is at least the profits it would obtain if were not to integrate. In
equilibrium the offer made by D1 exactly equals such profits, i.e. the offer
b1 = ΠU2 = 0.000531θ¯
4.
5 Total Sequential Integration (FIi)
Now suppose that firms sequentially integrate to form two single integrated
firms, Fi (= Di + Ui), i = 1, 2. The first pair of firms integrates in the first
stage, while the other contraintegrates in the third stage. Contraintegration
occurs after firms have set their quality investment. In the last stage, firms
produce output maximizing profits (equations [4a] and [4b]).
The input can be considered as an internal transfer for the firms as they
are integrated. This implies that firms do not compete in the input market.
We assume that the input prices are c1 = c2 = 0.
In the third stage, the non-integrated firm Dj makes an offer, bj, to firm
Uj to integrate. The smallest amount that Uj is willing to accept is the
9
Figure 3: Quality reaction functions when only one of the firms integrates
(PI). a) High quality firm intgrates (PI1); b) Low quality firm integrates
(PI2).
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profit it would obtain if it were not to integrate, i.e. bj = maxmj ΠUj , where
ΠUj = mj · qj (sj , si,mj, 0) and mj is the price of the input set by Uj.
In stage two, the "downstream" firms choose qualities that maximize their
profits. There is an integrated and an unintegrated firm in this stage. Firm,
Di, integrating in stage one, has already formed Fi (paying bi). The unin-
tegrated firm, Dj, meanwhile, could make an offer to counterintegrate with
Uj. The counterintegration offer, bj, is determined by the quality investment
chosen in the second stage.
Figure 4: Quality reaction functions under Sequential Integration (FI): a)
High quality firm integrates first (FI1); b) Low quality firm integrates first
(FI2).
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Once F1 forms, the offer that D2 makes to U2 will be b2 = s1s2θ¯
2
8(4s1−s2) .
Its profits will then be ΠD2 = pj(s1, s2) · qj(s1, s2) − s
2
i
2
− b2(s1, s2). As
mentioned earlier, its optimal investment decision, s2, is conditioned by its
subsequent effect on the bid b2, i.e., a higher s2 implies a higher b2. Note that
the quality reaction function of firmD2 in the second stage shifts towards the
origin (see figure 4a). The reason behind this is that the bidD2 makes (in the
fourth stage) depends directly upon the quality it selects (in this stage). As
a result the incentives to invest in quality are reduced. Comparing with the
case of Partial Integration we find that, in this case, the firm that integrates
first cannot raise its rivals costs (input costs are the same for both the firms).
It, however, raises the price firmD2 has to pay in order to vertically integrate
at a later stage. Equilibrium qualities are given by the intersection point of
the two reaction functions and are:
sFI11 = 0.250385θ¯
2 sFI12 = 0.039411θ¯
2 (8)
and output and profits in equilibrium are shown in table 3.
qFI11 = 0.479519θ¯ qFI12 = 0.260241θ¯
ΠFI1U1 = b1 Π
FI1
U2 = b2 = 0.001282θ¯
4
ΠFI1D1 = 0.026227θ¯
4 − b1 ΠFI1D2 = 0.000610θ¯
4
Table 3: Full Integration: High quality firm integrates first.
Now consider the case when the low quality firm integrates first forming,
F2. The offer made by firm D1, to integrate with U1, will then be b1 =
(2s1−s2)2θ¯2
8(4s1−s2) . The reaction function for the integrated firm F2 is the same as
the one for D2 in the NI case11 (see figure 4b). The reaction function of
the non-integrated firm, D1, shifts towards the origin. This shift is due
to the fact that a higher quality increases the offer that it makes at a later
stage. Obviously, a higher offer decreases its profits. As a result, the reaction
functions of the two firms do not cross. Once more, an equilibrium in pure
strategies does not exist for the case where the low quality firm integrates
first (case FI2). The only equilibrium in pure strategies in this case is one
where the low quality firm leapfrogs and produces the high quality good.
Finally, for the case FI1, the offer made by firm D1 that U1 accepts is
b1 = Π∗U2 , i.e., b1 = 0.001282θ¯
4.
11Using the same reasoning as in the FI1 case.
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6 Industry Structure in Equilibrium
The literature on vertical integration focuses on sequential integration12 as
a strategic decision against non-integrated rivals13. One of the important
results of this paper is that in the same structure as OSS and without the
possibility of setting a reserve price. The equilibrium values obtained are not
the same as in the NI case. Comparing with NI, input producing firms earn
positive profits. The profits of the downstream firm that integrates first in-
crease while the profits of the downstream firm that integrates later decrease.
The reason behind our results is that the decision to vertical integration im-
plies a fixed cost in terms of quality and output for the firm that integrates
first. For the firm that integrates later it is different. Its quality investment
directly influences the offer it makes to vertically integrate. The low quality
firm decreases its investment so as not to punish itself later (as it increases
its bid). Meanwhile, the high quality firm best responds by decreasing its
quality. Due to this, quality investment for both the firms decreases, with
the decrease for the low quality firm being of a greater magnitude. The
degree of product differentiation, measured as a ratio of the two qualities14,
increases from s2s1 = 0.36 (under NI) to
s2
s1 = 0.16 (under FI1). Given that its
rival endogenizes the cost of integration (thereby decreasing competition in
qualities), vertical integration permits the firm that integrates first to attain
profits closer to the monopoly level.
Our result differs from OSS if one does not consider the reserve price
assumption they make. They obtain total integration with the equilibrium
values for price and output not changing. Note that, a redistribution of
profits does take place in their case with the profits for the downstream firms
decreasing by the same amount as the profits for the upstream firms increase.
Under sequential integration, the game in OSS resembles a prisoners dilemma
where both firms want to integrate. Integration, in their model, decreases
profits for both the firms. Our structure is, however, different. The firm
that integrates first earns greater profits. The firm that integrates in the
subsequent stage, meanwhile, decreases its profits having made its quality
investment decision before integrating. The main feature of our model is the
12There are other models that do not analyze the strategic incentives to vertically inte-
grate. These models focus on industry structure obtained due to vertical integration, the
incentives to foreclose and its effect upon social welfare. These aspects have been studied
by Salinger (1988), Gaudet and Van Long (1996), Avenel (1997), Abiru et al. (1998) and
Higgins (1999).
13See OSS and Church and Gandal (2000) for a detailed discussion.
14Motta (1993) defines λ = s2s1 as the degree of product differentiation. λ = 1 implies
that the goods are perfect substitutes and λ = 0 implies maximum differentiation.
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fact that investment in quality is a long run variable. Integrating first, a
firm is able to increases its profits and the costs of its non-integrated rival.
Both the production (as in OSS and other similar models) and quality costs
for the non-integrated rival, meanwhile, increase. The effect of the increase
in quality investment in our model is similar to reserve price that OSS use
(exogenously) to obtain foreclosure.
7 Welfare analysis
Consumer surplus can be written as:
CS1 =
R 1
θ (θs1 − p1)dθ CS2 =
R θ
θ (θs2 − p2)dθ (9)
where the first and the second expression give us the consumer surplus for the
high, and low, quality consumers, respectively. Substituting [4a] and [4b] in
[10] we obtain CS1 (c1, c2, s1, s2) =
((2s1−s2)θ¯−2c1+c2)[s1(2s1+s2)θ¯−3s1c2−2c1(s1−s2)]
2(4s1−s2)2
and CS2 (c1, c2, s1, s2) =
(s1s2θ¯−2c2s1+s2c1)
2
2s2(4s1−s2)2
. Total consumer surplus, CS, can
be written as the sum of the two, which is:
CS =
¡
(2s1 − s2) θ¯ − 2c1 + c2
¢
s2
£
s1 (2s1 + s2) θ¯ − 3s1c2 − 2c1 (s1 − s2)
¤
+
¡
s1s2θ¯ − 2c2s1 + s2c1
¢2
2s2 (4s1 − s2)2
(10)
Defining total welfare (TW) as the sum of firm profits and consumer surplus
we can write:
TW = CS +
2X
i=1
(ΠDi +ΠUi) . (11)
Total welfare for the cases analyzed before are presented in table 4. Firms
would gain globally if only the high quality firm were to integrate. Note
that, this outcome only benefits the high quality firm. The low quality firm
obtains greater profits under NI and the input producers maximize profits
under FI1. Total profits increase when firms integrate sequentially. This is
due to the softening of competition in this case.
For consumers it is best if firms do not integrate, or integrate simultane-
ously15. Under FI1, where vertical integration influences long run variables,
total consumer surplus decreases overall, and by a greater amount for the
low quality consumers.
15Note that under simultaneous integration only profit redistribution takes place with
total welfare remaining the same.
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NI PI1 FI1
ΠUi , i = 1, 2 0 0.00053θ¯
4
0.00128θ¯4
ΠD1 0.01947θ¯
4
0.02966θ¯4 0.02494θ¯4
ΠD2 0.00273θ¯
4
0.00013θ¯4 0.00061θ¯4P2
i=1 (ΠDi +ΠUi) 0.02220θ¯
4
0.03085θ¯4 0.02812θ¯4
CS1 0.03677θ¯
4
0.03178θ¯4 0.03370θ¯4
CS2 0.00340θ¯
4
0.00014θ¯4 0.00133θ¯4
CS 0.04017θ¯4 0.03192θ¯4 0.03504θ¯4
TW 0.06238θ¯4 0.06277θ¯4 0.06316θ¯4
Table 4: Profits, Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare.
OSS show that the possibility to vertically integrate does not affect the
society globally. Total welfare is the same under NI and FI. This result is
obtained in our model only if the firms integrate simultaneously16. However,
in our model if firms integrate sequentially (FI1) then Total Welfare is greater
than under no integration (NI). This increase is due to the increase in profits
for the input producing and the high quality firm.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the incentives to vertically integrate in verti-
cally differentiated industries. An important aspect of such models is that
firms invest in long run variables such as quality. Taking into account en-
dogenous investment in quality we observe that vertical integration by a firm
does not only increase production costs for the rival. Vertical integration also
changes the incentives to invest in quality for both the firms. The high qual-
ity firm integrating first, increases the costs for the unintegrated downstream
rival. This increase is not directly an increase in quality costs, instead, in-
creased quality investment is reflected in the increased offer it has to make to
counterintegrate later. Increasing rival production costs, an integrated firm
is able to decrease quality investment for both the firms. Our paper points
out the importance of taking into account investment in long run variables
in such industries. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to point out the
negative effect on quality investment due to vertical integration.
Analyzing sequential mergers we find that the market that maximizes
16OSS only consider sequential integration. Allowing for simultaneous integration in
their model one obtains a totally integrated industry (as in our case).
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social welfare is Full Integration. The firm that merges first increases its
profits while the firm that merges later on earns lower profits. Total welfare
under this case is greater than under No-Integration.
The main difference between our paper and OSS is that they limit their
analysis to short run variables such as output and price. In their model, a firm
paying a price greater than marginal cost is able to offset this by vertically
integrating. Both then face the same conditions in the output competition
stage. This is, however, not the case in our model where quality investment is
sunk when the firm integrates in the following period. In our model, contra-
integration does not restore the initial conditions. The firm that integrates
later obtains lower profits. This is due to the fact that an increase in quality
implies a higher offer that a firm has to pay later on to integrate. As a
result, firm investment in quality decreases relative to No-Integration. The
high quality firm takes advantage of this situation, investing less in quality
and increasing its profits.
The result obtained in OSS is a partially integrated industry, where the
integrated firm sells the input to its rival at a “reserve price” such that the
rival’s profits with, or without, integration are the same. This aspect of their
model has been criticized in the literature as it is not an equilibrium of the
game they study17. Without the possibility of the reserve price, the result
in their model resembles a prisoners dilemma, where the industry is totally
integrated. Price and output obtained are the same as under No-Integration.
Downstream firms transfer part of their profits to the upstream firms as a
payment for integrating. In our model, however, there is no need to establish
such a reserve price. Full integration is observed with the difference that a
prisoners dilemma is not observed. Profits for the firm that integrates first
are greater than under no integration.
Even though quality investment declines and product differentiation in-
crease, from the social viewpoint sequential vertical integration is beneficial.
The firm that integrates first is the one that benefits the most. This result is
obtained in spite of the fact that in our model vertical integration does not
entail elimination of double marginalization.
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